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Abstract
In this paper, I discuss the elements of the avatarial game body. Using Don 
Ihde’s philosophy of technology, in addition with Richard Shusterman’s 
concept of somaesthetics, I break the avatar down into basic parts. I consider 
these parts through Shusterman’s understanding of the soma and Ihde’s 
postphenomenological discussions of human-technology relationships 
to devise somaster fiction. Somaster fiction, as I argue, is a convergence 
between the player’s real-life body and a computer game experience, 
presented through avatarial onscreen bodies in games such as the Grand 
Theft Auto franchise, and invisible non-avatarial agency, discussed in games 
like The Novelist and This War of Mine.
This paper incorporates each of Ihde and Shusterman’s main ideas 
about the body, which coalesce during the gameplay experience to enable 
players to become masters of an avatarial body and virtual topographical 
space. Somaster fiction discusses the different human-technology 
relationships that occur during gameplay and how a player is extended into 
the game world via controllers and avatars. This paper also touches on what 
a body is in accordance with Ihde and Shusterman, and how these concepts 
of bodyhood are reverberated within the game world.
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Introduction
Taking a leap of faith off the precipice of a virtual cliff edge, throwing a 
grappling hook and swinging onto a higher and more dangerous rock are 
essential elements of the action-adventure franchise games Uncharted1. 
Throughout these games, this type of avatarial control affords a player 
an elevated feeling of aliveness, excitement and vertigo, which in many 
cases will supersede our own mortal limitations of such risky thrill-seeking 
corporeality and acrobatic dexterity. The avatarial adventurer, Nathan 
Drake, protagonist of the first four installments of the Uncharted series, 
typically carries out such maneuverers with ease in the game world. He 
leaps, swims, climbs, swings and rappels from one near impossible location 
to another, causing my hands to become slick with sweat on the game 
controller as I watch Drake cling onto a vertiginous ledge. 
The significance of this sweat can be attributed to the high 
phenomenological investment of how my body is enfolded into the body of 
an avatar. Similar to Vivian Sobchack’s renowned account of how her fingers 
feel the movement of onscreen hands,2 a phenomenological relationship 
between a player and a game avatar is often at the heart of a computer 
game experience; particularly (but not exclusively) to when the avatar takes 
on a humanoid look and feel. 
A player’s relationship with a screen avatar is, to some extent, 
comparable with Jacques Lacan’s concept of (mis)recognition that takes 
place during the mirror stage.3 This is the idea that an infant upon gazing at 
itself in the mirror for the first time will develop their sense of self by seeing 
a more complete and accomplished “I” in the mirror. Hitherto, the infant’s 
experience of selfhood is what Malcolm Bowie describes as an “assemblage 
of fragmented limbs.”4 The mirror image enables the child to mis(recognize) 
their reflective selves as being more complete and having greater control. 
This notion continues through adolescence to adulthood, in which the 
mirror has been replaced with the cinema screen, or in this instance, 
computer games, whereupon players mis(recognize) their self through the 
avatarial body. In gaming, players become assimilated with the avatar in 
what David Sundow has referred to as an “electro-umbilical hookup.”5 As 
Sundow suggests, the avatar becomes an extension of the player’s physical 
gesticulation. 
Rune Klevjer’s ‘Enter the Avatar’ puts forth a similar proposition, 
when he describes how the practice of avatarial control is akin to the 
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mastery of a prosthetic marionette that is “hooked up to the player’s fingers 
by invisible strings.”6 As Klevjer asserts, gameplay progress is achieved by 
incorporating the avatar “as the on-screen extension of his or her own body, 
via the physical extension of the gamepad.”7 Consequentially the player 
experiences a form of shared identity that is necessary in order to progress 
through the game world.
In the field of computer games studies much has been written 
about this notion of shared identity and avatarial embodiment. James 
Newman’s ‘The Myth of the Ergodic Videogame’ for example considers the 
dichotomy of the player relationship in terms of an On-Line/Off-Line split.8 
For Newman, On-Line pertains to the direct influence and execution of 
movement through haptic controls that a player exercises during gameplay. 
In contrast, Off-Line is used to consider any game element that disrupts this 
agential link. This may take the form of cut-scenes, loading screens, replays 
or stats about the player’s performance, such as position and lap time at the 
end of racing games. Fundamentally, Newman uses the idea of an On-Line/
Off-Line approach to consider the complexity of the player relationship and 
to argue that computer games are misunderstood as a purely interactive 
medium. Newman’s paper foregrounds the idea that computer game 
players take on shifting roles as users and observers, which is a notion that 
this paper builds upon. 
This paper also channels into other issues in game studies around 
embodiment, particularly Martti Lahti’s paper, ‘As We Become Machines: 
Corporealized Pleasures in Video Games.’ Within his work, Lahti describes 
videogames as a technologically enhanced other that replaces and extends 
a natural body. As he states, games produce a “symptomatic site of a 
confusion or transgression of boundaries between the body and technology 
that characterizes contemporary culture.”9 This is reminiscent of Scott 
Bukatman’s book Terminal Identity: The Virtual Subject in Postmodern 
Science Fiction, which similarly articulates how video games “represent 
the most complete symbiosis generally available between human and 
computer—a fusion of spaces, goals, options and perspectives.”10 Similar to 
the work of Sherry Turkle,11 Ted Friedman,12 James Paul Gee,13 RT Nørgård14 
and many others, Lahti’s work considers how video games have been driven 
by the desire to “erase the boundary separating the player from the game 
world and to play up tactile involvement.”15
For Lahti, aesthetical developments from 2D to 3D graphics, 
combined with sensory apparatuses such as steering wheels, vibrating 
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controllers or any other haptic gaming device, enables a sensory melding 
between real and virtual space. As Lahti discerns, 
this delirium of virtual mobility, sensory feedback, 
and the incorporation of the player into a larger 
system thus [ties] the body into a cybernetic loop 
with the computer, where its affective thrills can 
spill over into the player’s space.16
The screen becomes a technologized form of vision that extends the 
player’s body into its virtual realm, composing a hybridity between body 
and technology, where players rehearse the controls of their avatars until 
intuitively mastered.
Just as Drake in Uncharted 4 negotiates and masters his environment 
through increased stamina and dexterity compared with that of a real-life 
body, so a player must proficiently negotiate their topographical game 
worlds through the mastery of an avatarial body. This mastery of the 
body in story-based computer games is what I call somaster fiction, a 
portmanteau of ‘soma’ and ‘master’, and a play on Richard Shusterman’s 
concept of somaesthetics. Within this paper I combine somaesthetics 
(which I will describe in due course) with Don Ihde’s postphenomenological 
hypothesis of human-technology relationships. Using Ihde’s framework, I 
will parse the computer game experience into basic elements as a way to 
consider the core essentials of computer gaming from a phenomenological 
perspective. To begin this investigation, I turn to the theoretical framework 
of postphenomenology, set out by Ihde’s philosophy of technology. 
Postphenomenology
Don Ihde’s postphenomenology is a philosophical concept that considers 
the relationship between a human body and a technology. Ihde’s work 
considers the ubiquity of tools and how such devices shape human 
existence, which is pervasive across our lifeworld. Following Marshall 
McLuhan’s Understanding Media: The Extensions of Man,17 Ihde’s work 
considers how different technologies extend, limit and alter the ontology of 
human experience. From bicycles and automobiles that increase our bodily 
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sense of speed through transport, to the extension of human vision through 
eyeglasses, Ihde’s postphenomenology contemplates how technological 
apparatuses reconfigure the human body, altering natural subjectivity. 
Postphenomenology follows the combined phenomenological 
philosophy of Martin Heidegger and Maurice Merleau-Ponty, each of whom 
respectively discuss concepts about the human body, primarily how it is the 
receptor for knowing the world around us (Merleau-Ponty), 18 and how this 
receptor is modified and reshaped by tools (Heidegger). 19 Ihde weaves these 
theoretical strands together to form his notion of postphenomenology, 
which I adopt within this paper by utilizing Ihde’s human-technology 
relationships. 
 Ihde’s work identifies four main human-technology relationships, 
which, as I am arguing, are the basic components that make up a computer 
game experience. These consist of: embodiment, hermeneutic, alterity 
and background relations. As a way to understand these relationships, 
beyond the description that follows, illustrations for each of these terms 
are presented in figures 1-4. Embodiment (figure 1) denotes a perception or 
experience through a technology as a tool becomes synthesized with a body 
in a particular way. Eyeglasses, writing utensils, a computer game controller 
or any other type of technology that is positioned between body and world, 
providing the body with some form of technological extension, where we 
act or perceive through the artefact, is what constitutes the embodiment 
relation. 
A hermeneutical relation (figure 2), in contrast to the embodiment 
relationship of seeing or acting through a technology, is an experience of 
a technology. “Hermeneutic” therefore pertains to a technology that we 
read, such as clocks, thermometers, maps, books, computer game graphics 
or any other tool that marks a separation between body and technology. As 
I will show throughout this paper, computer games possess hermeneutic 
qualities, insomuch that a player always reads a screen. 
An alterity relation (figure 3), unlike the first two examples, is a case 
in which a technology (from the perspective of the human) seemingly takes 
on a life of its own. In computer games, adversaries, non-player characters 
(NPCs), complicated moving environments are all elements of the alterity 
relationship, which provides the pleasure of the challenge. As Ihde states, 
alterity is 
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the sense of interacting with something other than 
me, the technological competitor. In competition 
there is a kind of dialogue or exchange. It is the 
quasi-animation, the quasi-otherness of the 
technology that fascinates and challenges. I must 
beat the machine, or it will beat me. 20
Finally, background relations (figure 4) are the encounters that 
humans have with a technology in the periphery of their awareness. 
Household lighting for example is a domestic instance of the “fringe 
awareness”21 that this technology has in relation to a human user. As Ihde 
asserts, background relations do “not usually occupy focal attention but 
nevertheless [condition] the context”22 for the human user. In computer 
games, background relations are a prime element of gameplay, particularly 
in the form of graphical virtual space, which plays a significant part in 
conditioning what an avatar can and cannot do, such as the way the locations 
in the Uncharted games condition Drake’s abilities and the player’s controls 
to climb, swim, drive or attack depending on the context of the level.
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 Figure 1: Embodiment Relation 23                             Figure 2: Hermeneutic Relation24
 
 Figure 3: Alterity Relation 25                               Figure 4: Background Relation26
In computer gaming, all four of Ihde’s human-technology relations 
are united, as background, alterity, hermeneutic and embodiment 
relations come together. The combination of these four human-technology 
ingredients, as I argue, structures the player to encounter the specific type 
of experience that I am calling ‘somaster fiction’. 
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As noted above, Ihde’s postphenomenology makes up one half of this term. 
The other half pertains to Shusterman’s writings on the soma from his work 
on Somaesthetics.
Somaesthetics
In Body Consciousness: A Philosophy of Mindfulness and Somaesthetics, 
Richard Shusterman describes somaesthetics (a neologism of ‘soma’ 
and ‘aesthetics’) as a discipline comprising of both theory and practice in 
relation to how sensory perception is used by the human body. And how in 
turn, the human body can hone and improve such sensory appreciation.27 
In his own words, Shusterman describes somaesthetics as a branch of 
philosophy that is “concerned with the critical study and meliorative 
cultivation of how we experience and use the living body (or soma) as a 
site of sensory appreciation (aesthesis) and creative self-fashioning.”28 
For Shusterman, such meliorative cultivation of the soma consists of two 
dimensions. The first is the way that the body is attuned to proprioceptive 
sensations, such as breathing, muscular awareness and other forms of inner 
sentient perception as a body. Examples among many include: hunger, 
satisfaction, calmness, stress, tiredness and tranquility. Shusterman’s first 
use of somaesthetics therefore relates to the body (or soma) as a dynamic 
instrument or medium for perception.
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 The second dimension pertains to the body as a site for self-creation 
and expression through its physical materiality. How we dress, groom 
and purport ourselves as bodies, enables us to convey values about our 
personhood to others. This is something particularly relevant in Rockstar’s 
Grand Theft Auto franchise, where the opportunity to dress or move avatars 
in particular ways, such as dance challenges in GTA San Andreas,29 will 
gain the player respect with other NPCs. Shusterman contends that these 
two dimensions of the soma, inner bodily perception and external bodily 
representation, are in practice connected to one another. This connection 
is why he uses the terms soma instead of body. As he explains, “[t]he 
term ‘soma’ indicates a living, feeling, sentient body rather than a mere 
physical body that could be devoid of life and sensation.”30 Put differently, 
Shusterman’s use of soma instead of ‘body’ is for the intent of identifying 
the body as distinct from a mere surface and material interpretation as a 
flesh bag. Ultimately, a body can be dead and have no feelings; Shusterman 
therefore uses soma to denote the body as an existing, feeling site of 
sentient subjectivity.
 Soma derives from the Greek word σῶμα, meaning body, and it is 
through an ancient Greek history that Shusterman comes to develop his 
term, which originates from one of his earlier works on pragmatist aesthetics. 
Within this book of the same name,31 he argues that pragmatist aesthetics 
“has the purpose of bringing art and life together.”32 For Shusterman, 
“pragmatism is a philosophy that emphasizes that the basis of thinking is 
acting, [and that humans] need to think and believe in order to act.”33 As 
Shusterman notes, wisdom, spirituality and perception is honed through 
cultivation of the body, a concept that is transferable to computer gaming. 
Within gaming, perception and knowledge of the game environment is 
similarly obtained through the corporeal mastery of the controller, avatar 
and virtual space. 
Shusterman identifies three aspects in somaesthetics, consisting 
of the experiential, the performative and the representational dimension. 
The experiential is the element of experience that makes someone feel 
good or better through somatic practices.34 He identifies yoga for example, 
as a method that improves the body as a site for sentient subjectivity 
through development of movement and breathing capacities, enabling 
a feel of invigoration. Such feelings of ‘betterness’ can also be attained 
representatively. For instance, cosmetic surgery is a commercial practice in 
which the body as a site of representation is aesthetically improved.35The 
representational dimension is therefore “a culture largely built on the 
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division of body from spirit and economically driven by the capitalism of 
conspicuous consumption that is fueled by the marketing of body images.”36 
In contrast, the performative dimension is something Shusterman describes 
as “performance-oriented disciplines [that] aim either at external exhibition 
or at enhancing one’s inner feelings of power, skill, and health.”37 
Henrik Smed Nielsen’s book, Playing Computer Games: Somatic 
Experience and Experience of the Somatic, utilizes Shusterman’s approach, 
arguing that the experiential, representational and performative 
dimensions of the soma, “simultaneously run through and constitute 
the process of playing computer games.”38 Nielsen argues that computer 
games, in terms of the experiential, are designed to make players feel good 
by making the gamer feel as if he or she is there within the game world.39 
He argues that such feelings of goodness are not limited to wholesome 
or ethical wellbeing (for most games exercise some level of violence) but 
rather, that such goodness resides in experiences that are “satisfyingly rich, 
through perceptual shock.”40 In other words, a feeling of invigoration can be 
achieved by game experiences that place the player’s soma in scenarios of 
exhilaration. 
In terms of representation, Nielsen argues that human avatar bodies 
within computer games conform to “certain physical ideals within Western 
culture.”41 His research is based upon two papers written by Nicole Martins, 
who identifies how the look of video game characters supersedes the 
average look of most men and women. In ‘A Content Analysis of Male Video 
Game Characters’,42 Martins notes how such avatarial representations are 
presented as “systematically larger than the average American male [body], 
in relation to muscle mass.”43 Similarly, Nielsen via Martins44 identifies how 
the bodies of female avatars are usually portrayed much more thinly than 
the average female form.45 This can be seen in characters such as Lara Croft 
from the Tomb Raider46 franchise, Faith Connors in Mirror’s Edge47and Jill 
Valentine from the Resident Evil48 series, amongst many others.49
The performative aspect of Shusterman’s somaesthetics 
again translates coherently to computer games, in which motor skills 
through corporeal practice improve over time through haptic rehearsal. 
Consequentially, Nielson highlights equilibrium between somaesthetics and 
computer games, a notion that is adopted and repurposed within this work. 
As I am arguing, avatar-based games utilize the performative, representative 
and experiential dimensions of the soma, which is channelled through 
Ihde’s concept of postphenomenological human-technology relationships. 
Volume 7 Number 1 (2018) |  149
Somaster Fiction and the Avatarial Game Body 
Through this corporeal combination of Ihde and Shusterman, 
players hone their gaming skills to become masters of a real and virtual 
soma experience. When playing an engrossing story-based computer 
game, I experience a feeling of excitement (Shusterman/Nielsen) and an 
experiential sense of anthropomorphism through the representation of 
the avatarial body. As I become assimilated to this screen body, learning 
to maneuver it through the performative dimension of the soma, so it 
becomes a tool that extends my gestures (Ihde), which in turn permits me 
to access the fictional universe.
The soma as a meliorative site for body and narrative cultivation 
through mastery of controls, avatar and game space, is how I formulate the 
notion of somaster fiction. In open world games such as Skyrim50 or Fallout 
4,51 all of Shusterman and Ihde’s concepts are woven together, constructing 
a somaster style of game story. Skyrim and Fallout 4 require a player to 
construct an avatar, choosing race, sex, gender, body type and appearance, 
which upon completion, spawns their avatar visibly into the game world. 
In Skyrim, the choices that the player makes open the character up 
to different possibilities. Different races have different abilities in the form of 
strength, weapon or magic skills, craftsmanship, stealth or thievery. These 
early choices guide the type of game style that the player will perform. 
Once the player’s avatar enters the vast land of Skyrim, they are free to 
explore. Through this exploration, my avatar comes across many towns, 
villages, caverns and landmarks inhabited by NPCs, who offer me rewards 
for missions. I am free to undertake these tasks or decline them whenever 
I choose. Thus I am not confined to linearity but do need to engage in such 
tasks in order to increase my strength and gain experience points. 
Experience and rehearsal within gaming become the key to somatic 
mastery of the topographical game space. Every attack I perform, with the 
vast arsenal of weaponry at my disposal, increases my swordsmanship, 
archery skills or spell casting powers. The more I do the stronger I become, 
and the further I travel, the more space I command. Each time I discover 
a new landmark, the location is automatically added to a map (enabling 
me to fast travel to the location whenever I choose). The map is thus filled 
in through my movements and actions, which by mastering, opens the 
game world to the player. Somaster fiction therefore equates to Ihde’s 
embodiment, hermeneutical, alterity and background relationships, 
enfolded and linked into one another, uniting a virtual body (the avatar) 
with a real-life body (the player).
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By using the controller, I embody, and am simultaneously extended 
by both the technological hardware of the apparatus and the virtual avatar; 
both become extensions of my corporeality. During gameplay I experience 
a sense of speed and freedom through the virtual body navigating the 
lands. However, working in the background is a stamina limit, presented 
as a hermeneutical bar at the bottom of the screen that appears only when 
the player is sprinting. The longer I run, the sooner the avatar’s stamina 
depletes, until eventually I feel the controls becoming less effective and 
sluggish. When this happens, I must stop and rest to replenish the bar 
whereupon it will disappear from view, retreating into the background of 
the game experience. This background relation thus serves to condition the 
perceived freedom of movement. It limits the possibility for what can be 
done and also sets the parameters for the challenge in the game. 
In Skyrim, the running ability is also hindered by other elements 
of the game’s background such as inventory (armor, weapons and crafting 
materials) that my character wears and carries. When picking up items, 
they are stored within an inventory screen within the background of the 
game, ready to be equipped or put to use when the player requires them. 
Each item is assigned a weight value offsetting a carry value that my avatar 
can manage. If the avatar is overladen with inventory, movement becomes 
strenuous, and the avatar will not be able to run, while movement on the 
controller will feel heavy and sluggish.
Such detail offers the player a sense of realism, where real-world 
gravitational rules are loosely established in the virtual. This offers familiarity 
while allowing the player to make bespoke decisions about what to carry 
and leave behind, inevitably steering the course of events into a customized 
experience of fictionality. The embodiment and background relationships 
work in relation to the hermeneutical graphics of the game and the alterity 
of the enemies, challenging the player through combat. Within Skyrim and 
other open world games like it, the avatar body must ‘work out’ and train, 
like a real-life gym body, to increase strength and stamina through repetitive 
practice. As Torben Grodal proclaims in his writings about computer games, 
the key to advancing through the experience of computer gaming relies 
upon the repetition of cognition and motor skills that must be practiced until 
mastered. Gaming is thus a process of repetitive rehearsal52 that is predicated 
on the sequence of “unfamiliarity and challenge, then mastery, and finally 
automation.”53 This investment of rehearsal, time and experience within 
Skyrim or any game, unlocks power ups, greater endurance and skills for the 
avatar and player’s body through the combination of Ihde’s four relationships.
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The somaster body is about mastery, control and improvement 
over an avatarial body through repetitive practice, which falls in line with 
Shusterman’s concept of somaesthetics. Somaster fiction is experiential 
in Shusterman’s sense of the term in the way that gameplay, as stated 
by Nielsen and supported firsthand by my own experiences, is enjoyable 
and makes a player feel good through perceptual shock in a controlled 
environment. Somaster fiction is also performative and representational in 
accordance with Shusterman’s hypothesis. Gameplay, as Nielsen highlights, 
is performative through corporeal motor skills upon controllers, and 
representational, in accordance with how the avatar looks to the player. 
This is in addition to how the avatar also looks to in-game characters or 
other (online) players. These elements of Shusterman’s somaesthetics, 
combined with Ihde’s four human-technology relationships, are the basis 
for the idea of somaster fiction, which to recapitulate, is mastery of the 
soma through the engagement between the body and technology of the 
controller and avatar.
Present and Absent Avatars 
Now that a preliminary understanding of somaster fiction has been 
established (through Ihde’s four human-technology relationships and 
Shusterman’s somaesthetics), the following section will flesh these ideas 
out by analyzing three different types of avatarial experience. Here I will 
be considering somaster fiction and the playing body through present and 
absent avatars. I begin with the visibly present, fast-paced action avatar 
popularized in game franchises such as Uncharted, Skyrim and Grand Theft 
Auto. These agile and forceful avatars that require sustained input from the 
player will be compared with slower and more methodical types of games. 
As I will demonstrate, such games often utilize imperceptible absent avatars, 
which I explore through the thought-provoking game The Novelist. Finally, 
I combine the fast-paced present avatar with the slower methodical absent 
avatar to consider a different type of playing experience through This War 
of Mine. To begin, I now consider the action game and the visibly present 
avatar. This opens with a brief discussion about what a body is (through 
Ihde) and its relationship to tools (through Heidegger).
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Present Avatars
In games such as Skyrim, Red Dead Redemption,54 or franchises such as 
Fallout or Grand Theft Auto, to name a few, a player works their way through 
a world and a story by way of an avatarial body. This virtual body has 
undergone significant transformation through the developmental epochs 
from early computer consoles. Andrew Burn and Gareth Schott have 
addressed this idea in their work, ‘Heavy Hero or Digital Dummy,’ stating 
how the avatar has evolved to a multimodal two-part structure consisting 
of a fictional character and digital tool that interdependently leak into one 
another. Burn and Schott predicate this notion primarily on an analysis of 
the character Cloud from the action adventure game Final Fantasy 7,55 but 
this idea can be applied to any avatar in any open world story game.
Fundamentally, Burn and Schott surmise that the player avatar 
relationship is a hybridized phenomenon of a game text. Just as the word 
text derives from the Latin word texere, meaning to weave, the player avatar 
relationship in fictional games similarly weaves together an experience that 
is both read entwined with one that is played. This flags up the avatarial body 
in terms of Ihde’s hermeneutical and embodiment relationships, as well as 
Shusterman’s somaesthetics, whereupon the body exists simultaneously as 
a site for feeling and sensory perception, in tandem to representation. This 
notion is also echoed in Shaun Gallagher’s book, How the Body Shapes the 
Mind, where the author breaks the body down into a body image and a body 
schema. As Gallagher asserts, 
[a] body image consists of a system of 
perceptions, attitudes and beliefs pertaining to 
one’s own body. In contrast, a body schema is a 
system of sensory-motor capacities that function 
without awareness or the necessity of perceptual 
monitoring. This conceptual distinction between 
body image and body schema is related 
respectively to the difference between having a 
perception of (or belief about) something and 
having a capacity to move (or an ability to do 
something).56 
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Gallagher’s ideas resonate with Ihde’s, who similarly recognizes the 
breakdown of the body into two components that he terms body one and 
body two.57 Primarily, this is Ihde’s hypothesis that the body is both a motile, 
perceptive, sensing being in the world, which he calls body one. Body two is 
the term Ihde uses to highlight how a body is also structured as a cultural 
inscriber in terms of age, race, gender, class or sexuality.
Ihde’s terms ‘body one’ and ‘body two’ are interchangeable with 
what he refers to as a ‘here-body’ and an ‘image-body’, a concept he adapts 
from R.D. Laing’s The Divided Self. Within this work, Laing discerns that the 
human body consists of both an embodied and an unembodied self, which 
he describes in the following way.
The embodied person has a sense of being flesh 
and blood and bones, of being biologically alive 
and real: he knows himself to be substantial. To 
the extent that he is thoroughly ‘in’ his body, he 
is likely to have a sense of personal continuity 
in time. The unembodied self, as onlooker at all 
the body does, engages in nothing directly. Its 
functions come to be observation, control, and 
criticism vis-à-vis what the body is experiencing 
and doing, and those operations which are 
usually spoken of as purely ‘mental.’58 
What Laing describes and Ihde adapts can be considered in relation to the 
avatarial game body. 
When playing any avatar-based story game, I simultaneously am 
the avatar, where I look through it to see the world before me, and have 
a relationship of the avatar that I observe as a character. I have a sense of 
perceptual beliefs about the character I am using, which I gauge from the 
onscreen image-body, cut-scenes and interaction with other NPCs. I also 
have an experience of the body schema that I take into my phenomenological 
experiencing when I use the buttons on the controller. Paul Martin has 
addressed this duality of the avatarial tool from a Heideggerian perspective 
of being both ready-to-hand, that which we play through, and present-to-
hand, that which we observe.59 
154  |  Evental Aesthetics
Daniel Paul O’Brien
Heidegger’s ready-to-hand affords the user praxis or a ‘practical 
behavior’ rather than a theoretical one. Praxis binds a human user and a 
technology in a process of withdrawal; a term that denotes a temporary 
fusion between a user and an external technology as one withdraws into the 
other. In the act of gaming, for example, the controller or avatar withdraws 
into the grip and actions of its user. The controller/avatar temporarily fuses 
with its user, tracing their corporeality whilst at the same time changing their 
world, which in gaming affords the player to access the virtual topography 
of the game world. As Heidegger asserts, ready-to-hand is a type of ‘fitting 
in with technology’ into a network of equipment, such as the ink to the pen, 
the pen to the paper, the paper to the desk and so forth. A tool with ready-
to-hand properties puts its human user into this network, whereupon the 
user operates with the tool “bound up with other equipment that is useful 
to us in engaging in the projects that mark the space of our concern.”60
The ready-to-hand relationship posits that when a user is engaged 
in a task while using a tactile tool, such as a pen to write, a hammer to 
hit nails or a spade to dig the earth, a process of withdrawal takes place 
between body and tool, at which point they are synthesized together in 
the networked act of writing, hammering or digging. During this process, 
the user encounters an intuition, competence and inclination through their 
tool in order to accomplish the task at hand. As Heidegger maintains, the 
carpenter, when hammering nails, does not consider the properties of the 
hammer as an object made of wood and metal but instead is absorbed in 
the activity before them. Similarly, when gaming, one does not focus on the 
avatar or controller, but rather looks and acts through them to the task at 
hand. Here we are reminded of Newnan’s distinction of an On-Line/Off-Line 
split, which draws similarities with Heidegger’s ready-to-hand and present-
at-hand terminology.
Present-at-hand denotes a different type of relationship to ready-to-
hand. While ready-to-hand is distinguished by the user’s activity or perception 
through a technology, present-at-hand concerns itself with an awareness of 
the technology. As Jeremy Wisnewski notes, the act of hammering does not 
require the user to think about the hammer explicitly, instead focus goes 
through the hammer to the terminus of the nail. However, if the hammer 
should break or get misplaced, it ruptures this task, causing the user to 
then think about the hammer explicitly. A comparison can be made when 
something happens during an Off-Line moment of a computer game, such 
as a cut-scene, which takes the player out of the action and prompts them to 
view their avatar as a character rather than see through it as a tool. 
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As tidy as Martin’s idea is, that an avatar possesses both ready-to-
hand and present-at-hand traits, it is somewhat reductive for fictional games 
that can stretch beyond these two confined categories of using and looking. 
This is why Ihde is more befitting to this medium. Instead of incorporating 
Heidegger’s terms, we can instead adopt Ihde’s by using his range of human-
technology relations, which can be dissected into embodied, hermeneutic, 
background and alterity relations, which as I am arguing, are the essential 
components that formulate somaster fiction.
This can be understood when we consider that avatars in graphic 
or text-based computer games in general, are hermeneutic in their nature, 
insomuch that the player reads the imagery or text onscreen in order 
to assess what is happening and what their response should be. Such 
responses come by way of the controller: an embodied input relationship 
that powers the avatar, affording the player agency within the game, while 
the game world acts as a background relationship, enabling the avatar to 
act in a particular way. As previously noted, these four relationships are also 
localized to the avatar itself. 
In GTA San Andreas for example, players control a character named 
CJ. In order to master the game, the player has to look after CJ by feeding 
him, exercising him and dressing him in a way that will earn him respect and 
appeal to the opposite sex. If I neglect to take CJ to the gym, or fail to run 
him about the city, the avatar loses stamina points. If I combine this with 
overfeeding him junk from any of the fast-food chains within the city, he will 
visibly gain weight and lose stamina.
Once this happens, pressing the button that makes him run will 
only take effect for a few brief moments before CJ loses breath (audibly 
conveyed) and reverts to sluggish, lethargic movement, which I feel through 
the controller. These fictional details highlight the hybridization of alterity 
and background relationships, insomuch that CJ’s diet and exercise regime 
are remembered within the background of the game, and are illustrated 
both hermeneutically through the avatar’s appearance and haptically 
through the rapid ease or slow effect of the controls. These changes do not 
take immediate effect but are a continuous and durational reconstruction, 
which plays out in the background of the avatar as an absent presence, 
existing unnoticed, but all the time changing. 
The more time I spend utilizing CJ like a tool in activities such as 
driving, running or lifting weights, the more responsive this avatarial tool 
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becomes to these respective tasks. Kiri Miller’s discussion of CJ in her 
book, Playing Along, considers how the multimodal two-part structure of 
the avatar (outlined by Burn and Schott above) works with the player to 
achieve goals. As Miller notes, “[t]he avatar has a programmed, unconscious 
repertoire of skills and behaviors, and the player must gradually acquire 
a parallel embodied knowledge of the commands required to animate 
him.”61 As Miller observes, the CJ avatar has virtual ‘autonomy’ through the 
way a single button press on the controller will prompt him to carry out a 
complicated series of gestures. A button press near a car for example will 
prompt CJ to run to a car, open the door, grab and drag the driver and hurl 
them into the road. This single click of the button in my real-world space 
sparks an alterity of violence in the virtual. As Miller and James Paul Gee 
argue, this is an instance of surrogacy in which player, ‘avatar-as-tool’ and 
‘avatar-as-character’, coalesce.
As Gee states, “the real-world player gains a surrogate, that is, the 
virtual character the player is playing.”62 The player inhabits the avatar, taking 
on the goals of the surrogate as their own. Consequentially, “the player 
and the character each have knowledge that must be integrated together 
to play the game successfully.”63 Through “distributed knowledge”64 and 
collaborative learning, the player and avatar acquire skills through practice. 
Rehearsal, as Miller and Grodal assert, is thus key to victory, a notion that 
Marie-Laure Ryan also maintains when she writes, “repetitiveness is an 
asset, since it is by performing the actions over and over again that players 
acquire the physical skills necessary to excel at the game.” 65 
Absent Avatars
In action based gaming, avatars are usually presented as more physically 
resilient and morally free compared with our real-life bodies. In the game 
world we have infinite lives to take risks, we are also morally and lawlessly 
unbounded to hurt and kill other NPCs without hesitation. However, in 
recent years the ubiquity of independent games studios has ushered in a 
range of less action-oriented non-avatar games that focus more upon story 
through humanity and spirituality, which was significant in my playing 
experience of The Novelist.66
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This non-avatar computer game is advertised as “a game about 
life, family and the choices we make.” This 3D graphical experience (played 
with keyboard and mouse), takes place within the restricted vicinity of a 
bucolic holiday home overlooking an ocean. The three characters that 
inhabit this space are: Dan Kaplan, a novelist with a deadline working on 
his most difficult book to date, his wife Linda who is feeling the strain of 
Dan’s workload and their young son Tommy, who misses the attention his 
dad once gave him. In playing this game, I do not possess an avatarial body 
but do possess the characters and fictional setting, so to speak. I have a first 
person view that can move and look around the home, but my image-body 
is invisible to me and to the Kaplan family. This is because I play a spirit, a 
virtual presence within the home whose job it is to read the thoughts and 
observe the actions of these characters, while attempting to suture the 
family unit back together as a whole. 
 This involves entering the mindsets of these characters and 
searching their emotions, which are hermeneutically presented as pictorial 
memories, sometimes with dialogue. It is also important that I search 
the house for clues too. Dan’s notes, Linda’s diary, and pictures drawn by 
Tommy, each offer significant bits of information about the fragile mindset 
of each character. It is left up to me to translate these messages and feelings 
to each of the characters so they can see things from another’s perspective. 
My incorporeal presence means I cannot touch the other characters or 
props within the game, neither do I possess an inventory or have any 
ability to power up. Unbeknown to me as a player though, I do have some 
abstractive form of physicality, as I can be detected by the characters if I do 
not properly conceal myself. If this happens the characters become fearful 
which depletes any influence I have over them. Therefore, somaster fiction 
in this world is achieved by staying hidden from characters rather than 
aggressive confrontation, as is usually the case in the open world action 
games.
To maintain manipulation, moving around the house stealthily 
becomes a necessary component of the gaming experience. The most 
effective way to carry this out is by possessing the light fixtures within 
the home, where I can travel like light from bulb to bulb in what could be 
considered a reminiscent undertone of Marshall McLuhan’s light bulb as 
a medium without content,67 with me as avatar without body. The ironic 
concept of using the lights to keep out of sight enables me to maintain 
influence over the Kaplans. The network of light paths allows me to move 
swiftly through the space, slip by the family or distract them by causing a 
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light fixture to flicker. This has the effect of drawing characters away from 
their activities to come and investigate the fault; leaving me free to explore 
the space they were just occupying in order to learn their latest thoughts. 
 In the game, I must remain hidden to read these thoughts, which 
present specific desires from each of the characters. These consist of 
the father’s desire for solitude so that he can progress with his work, the 
mother’s desire for her husband and the son’s desire for the attention of 
his father. Each character desire conflicts and it is up to me to action one 
which will always mitigate the other two. Deciding whose fate will succeed 
and whose will fail puts me in an authorial godlike position of being above 
the Kaplans and looking down. In the game this is often the case as I watch 
from the vantage point of the overhead lights. But in reality, this is also 
reverberated through my physical corporeality of being situated over the 
keys of my computer, which have a fixed position of always being below me. 
This, of course, is in contrast to the wireless controller I used for the plethora 
of action games, which were constantly tethered to my every movement. 
During those games, where my arms instinctively shot right as if to dodge 
trouble through the phenomenological confusion between an onscreen 
enemy and my corporeal response, the controller followed me and stayed 
with me. It became part of every series of gestures to do and not to do with 
the game. If I needed to scratch my face during gameplay, the controller 
naturally followed me up.
The methodical pace of The Novelist on the other hand does not 
require me to be so ‘umbilically’ hooked up to it, to borrow Sudnow’s 
phrase. I do not grip the whole computer; instead my hands hover over it 
just as my invisible presence hovers over the Kaplans. In the same way that 
a body is compounded of both corporeal and cultural elements, as argued 
by both Shusterman and Ihde, my physical control of the game becomes 
entangled with the incorporeal (and cultural) side of what a body is, bleeding 
into the space of the game world. The Novelist inclines more towards a 
hermeneutical relationship than an embodied one. I read the game more 
than I play it, from an elevated position outside of a character. Reading, as 
Ihde claims, is always phenomenologically performed in western cultures 
from an elevated position. Our bodies are used to reading when we look 
down upon the pages of a book. As Ihde states, 
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normally, we sit, with book in front of and usually 
below our eyes, or, as was quite normal in the 
Middle Ages, standing, reading from above. In 
that respect there was already a sedimented 
practice regarding the reader/text position with 
relation to a bodily perceptual stance.68 
 
This elevated posture over the book, or keyboard in this instance, 
allows the reader to take on a superior position in which form mirrors 
content. In The Novelist, the superior position is felt as the player ‘reads’ the 
events from above and subsequently manipulates the characters through 
the combination of: embodiment (button pressing), hermeneutic (character 
reading) background (the house) and alterity (character reaction). The 
concurrence of these elements is what establishes somaster fiction, which 
is at work as I do my best to try and make each character happy in a game 
that I read more than play, spiritually enhanced in this case by the removal 
of an avatarial body and replaced with bodiless, ghostlike movement. 
According to Ihde, 
[w]ith reading there is always perception, but 
a particularly structured perception. It is a 
perception which, normally, carries with it a 
dampening of bodily motion, a fixed place for its 
object, an enhancement of the visual, and the 
privileging of an elevated or overhead position.69
The Novelist does reduce motility but physical controls are still necessary 
for the alterity (seemingly independent personalities) of the game’s 
characters to respond to my actions. Therefore it still counts as an instance 
of somaster fiction as my embodiment relationship (through the keyboard) 
works with and affects the alterity of the Kaplan family. I register this 
through hermeneutical graphics and sound, all of which is confined to the 
background design of the house, which conditions my movements as well 
as the characters. Through these combined relationships, I am able to affect 
in-game events in order to co-author a fictional experience. 
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A final case study that I now want to consider is a game that unifies 
characteristics of the present/absent avatar games that I have discussed 
so far, to offer a different type of fictional experience. This War of Mine,70 
a game I played on the iPhone format, is a survival-come-strategy game 
in which the player controls a group of civilians sheltered within a large 
house, amidst a besieged war-torn city. The player has to look after these 
survivors by seeing to their basic survival needs, such as feeding, resting 
and entertaining them. The player takes on these challenges through touch 
screen controls, where I select a character and then choose an action. 
 The game begins with the player controlling three to four characters 
within a large derelict house. Overseeing a group of characters such as this 
is what Gordon Calleja refers to as “the space of miniatures,”71 where the 
player is positioned outside of the action looking in at a group of characters 
(as opposed to the shared identity of a single avatar). In further contrast, 
the characters in This War of Mine, distinct from the avatars of action-based 
games, are more detrimentally susceptible to their environment, which 
physically and emotionally drains them over the course of gameplay. 
Furthermore, if one of them should die they cannot be bought back, which 
has negative repercussions to the mentality of the other occupants. 
Each survivor has unique character traits that can be put to use to 
aid the perseverance of the household, which is what the aim of the game 
is, to survive until ceasefire. In order to do this the player must control the 
men and women of the household to fulfill certain tasks: craft beds and 
furniture from makeshift materials scattered about the house, construct a 
cooker and heater to prepare meals and survive the deadening weather if it 
should turn cold. Tools also need to be created from household materials, 
discoverable in each room; shovels for example need to be made in order to 
clear bomb damage rubble. 
Unlike The Novelist, where gameplay takes the form of hiding from 
characters within a house and reading their thoughts from above, This War 
of Mine compels the player to touch characters, then environments, in order 
for them to carry out a comprehensive action. While The Novelist is primarily 
about hermeneutically reading characters and choosing events to play out 
from afar from a spectral-like body, This War of Mine is more about being 
embodied and extended through the different avatarial bodies, as the game 
details the meticulous practicalities of hands-on action in a realistic way. 
For instance, it will take certain characters a number of hours (in game time) 
to clear away rubble with their hands when I select them to perform this 
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task. Therefore it is key to command each character to be doing something 
simultaneously, as I oversee them from a privileged position and press 
instructions with my fingers to sculpt onscreen actions. Consequentially, 
the controls in each respective title complements the content; minimum 
controls for the absent body reading experience of The Novelist, versus 
touch screen controls for the tactile multi-bodied and multitasking action 
game of This War of Mine.
Once I have delegated a job to an avatar, by touching them, the 
baton of action becomes an alterity relationship, in the sense that the 
avatar will continue the task independently and unsupervised (in the 
background), freeing me to delegate other jobs to the rest of the household, 
where I can make them work through until nighttime. At the end of the day, 
I select a character to scavenge a particular area of the city. In these sections 
I control a single character, and the practice now conforms to a more 
agential, action-based style of gameplay. I enter new locations in the hopes 
of finding supplies to prolong my household’s existence. Here I must select 
which character to use. Some large male characters can carry more but they 
are slower, while smaller female characters are quicker and stealthier but 
have a more limited carry capacity. Alterity through the unique attributes 
of the character, their virtual body size and abilities are thus factored into 
the fictionality of the game. My own body through the controller, combined 
with the alterity of the virtual character body (hermeneutically presented 
through graphics) compounds with the game’s background clock and 
inventory, to produce this gaming instance of somaster fiction. 
NPCs within these scavenging locations are divided between other 
looters and residents. I must move cautiously to avoid detection and being 
killed. It is possible, however, to make my character kill another, especially 
if armed with a weapon but this will often result in my character suffering 
a form of post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) once they return home. It 
is through this PTSD that the character’s alterity comes to the fore, as they 
suddenly begin to lose hope and become inconsolable and uncontrollable. 
They do not want to eat even though a hermeneutical indicator (another 
instance of the background relationship) flags up their hunger and they will 
not sleep despite similar readings indicating their exhaustion. They become 
broken avatars both as fictional characters and agential tools, which can 
lead to suicide or abandonment of the house. On one such occasion, having 
sent one of my housemates, Arica, out to rob food from a defenseless elderly 
couple, she returns home guilt ridden. Her anxiety triggers self-neglect 
and she becomes ill, torturing herself with her heinous actions, denoted 
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via a speech bubble that portrays regret for the old couple’s plight. Arica’s 
perturbation spreads outwardly to the other housemates who worry for her, 
concerned that she may not make it.
 When characters suffer from PTSD and I lose the ability to control 
them, I can use other characters in the house to try and make the distressed 
ones feel better. If successful, I may even be able to get one of the characters 
to encourage the perturbed one to eat, slowly steering them back on route 
to recovery. Thus mastery of the alterity is structured by ethical decision-
making, morality and human touch. Here we are reminded of Shusterman’s 
use of somaesthetics as a way to feel better and attain divine spirituality. 
The game, which is about survival, raising sprits and making wholesome 
decisions is also fundamentally about the complexity of being human and 
engaging with human-to-human contact. This subject matter, which is 
becoming prevalent in independent games, is reinforced through controls 
on a touch screen interface, where the ability to touch characters physically, 
reverberates into a story of how the characters within the game touch each 
other emotionally.
Conclusion
To conclude, this paper has introduced the concept of somaster fiction, 
an avatarial game body through the building blocks of Ihde’s human-
technology relationships, and Shusterman’s somaesthetics. Somaster 
fiction, as I have argued, requires repetitive practice of the body to master 
controls in order to push fictional game events forward. Within somaster 
fiction, embodiment, hermeneutical, background and alterity relationships 
coalesce, enabling the player to experience control, agency, power and 
mastery over an avatarial or invisible body, and the environment that it exists 
within. Somaster therefore accounts for the mastery of bodily controls over 
a controller, virtual avatarial soma and command of a topographical space. 
Control and mastery over each of these phenomena is what I 
experience when playing a role in fictional open world 3D universes that 
loosely look and feel like the real-life one I am accustomed to. However, 
within this screen universe I can do things differently (through the visible 
present avatar) than I can from my own, where I am restricted by real-life 
bodily obligations to feed and rest. Somaster fiction through an invisible 
avatarial body, such as the ones experienced in The Novelist or This War of 
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Mine, ascends me to the status of an incorporeal superior presence, where I 
command mastery over the bodies of other characters. 
 Somaesthetics, as I have argued through Shusterman and Nielsen, 
is relevant to computer games in the way that a player feels a positive 
sense of aliveness through gameplay. A player conducts corporeal input 
upon a controller in order to push events forward, and has an onscreen 
representation that temporarily becomes a shared part of the player’s 
identity. In line with somaesthetics, I have also highlighted how computer 
game playing is a meliorative process of cultivation that utilizes repetitive 
practice to ingrain controls into the user’s body, which in turn rewards the 
avatar with upgrades, making the controls more effective and responsive. 
Furthermore, I have aligned Shusterman’s concepts of the body with Ihde’s 
insomuch that a body is a dual entity in terms of sensory perception as 
well as a site for material representation. This is pertinent to avatar-based 
games where the look and feel of the character are conjoined, such as GTA’s 
CJ. This was compared with non-avatarial or semi-avatarial games, such as 
The Novelist and This War of Mine. Through these games I considered how a 
culturally constructed body and real-life body are depicted through both the 
synopsis of the game’s story, reinforced through the types and techniques 
of the controller. Somaster fiction thus serves as a postphenomenological 
approach to consider the elements that make up an avatar through the 
complexity of being a body and the body’s engagement through human-
technology relationships. 
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